The World’s ‘Murder Capital,’ Transformed

[Lucinda F. Boyd]

Monday, February 27, 2012 04:59

The World’s ‘Murder Capital,’ Transformed

Juarez Municipal Police have seen a decrease in crime after employing such tactics as stop-and-frisk, often employed in New York City.
Photo by Joseph J. Kolb

Juarez, the Mexican border city once notoriously dubbed the “Murder Capital of the World,” is taking a cue from Big Apple-style policing.

Twenty years after New York City became one of the early pioneers of policing strategies such as Compstat and “Broken Windows,” Juarez has begun applying a version of those strategies in its own battle against drug violence and street crime—with similar success.

At a time when many regions of Mexico continue to be riddled with almost daily shootings, the number of reported murders in Juarez has dropped 38 percent between 2010 and 2011, from 3,011 to 1,904, according to figures from the Chihuahua State Attorney’s Office.

There are other factors responsible for the decline, such as increased cooperation between city, state and federal authorities; and homicides remain a disturbing fact of life in a city that has been ground zero for feuding drug cartels.

But the changes in law enforcement strategy set in motion by the city’s new mayor and police chief have led to a gradual return of pedestrian traffic and a climate of security. 

Hector Murguia took office as mayor in January 2011. Three months later, he appointed Julian Leyzaola, former chief of Tijuana police, to head the city’s demoralized 2,300-member police force.

Both men acknowledge they were intrigued by the no-nonsense stand against crime in the mid- 1990s adapted by then-New York Mayor Rudolf Giuliani—and the “community policing” strategies developed by his colorful appointee as NYPD Commissioner: Bill Bratton. 

Introducing Compstat 

Leyzaola introduced a version of Compstat, a geomapping tool that allows law enforcement to identify crime spikes and swiftly shift resources to intervene in high-crime neighborhoods.  Compstat was one of the most widely admired tools introduced by Bratton—and is now used in many U.S. police departments.

Murguia, interviewed in his City Hall office, wouldn't discuss specific police strategies, citing security reasons.

But he credited Compstat and other New York innovative approaches, such as stepped-up foot patrols and more direct street contact with city residents, with helping to transform previously no-go areas of Juarez.

“Similar to the New York City strategies, we have begun to establish zones in the city where we send our police resources where they are most needed to fight crime,” he said.

More controversially, Juarez has also adopted a particularly tough variation of New York’s “Stop and Frisk” policies.  Suspicious vehicles or pedestrians are stopped and searched by automatic-weapon-wielding police, many of whom have their faces covered.

Murguia makes no apologies for the rough tactics.

“I see these (criminals) as beasts, and they need to be stopped,” he says.

Sharing Ideas

Police around the world frequently share notes and ideas, but can law enforcement strategies in one country really be successfully adopted in another—with very different conditions?

According to Bratton, one key is a willingness to be open to new policing concepts.

"The police in Juarez have finally turned a corner into the twentieth century with how they are now policing," says Bratton, who served as chief of the Los Angeles police before becoming chairman of Kroll, one of the world’s leading risk management firms, and consults with overseas law enforcement in Latin America and Europe.

Bratton, who has never been to Juarez, said he is pleased that the city appeared to be using a “variation” of the Compstat model.

"Latin America has not been sophisticated in accumulating crime data, which caused challenges in assigning personnel," says Bratton. 

But just as importantly, he adds, Mexican law enforcement needs to tackle the culture of corruption among police and politicians.

Murguia couldn’t agree more. 

Officers Fired

Juarez officers don’t stay on the job long, because many can’t afford to. With an average salary of $800 per month, turnover is high, and bribe-taking has been an attractive option to supplementing their income.  Since he took office, Leyzaola has fired 160 officers for corruption and, according to published reports, he may have his sights on another 400.

Local police corruption and incompetence are among the reasons Mexican President Felipe Calderon deployed more than 5,000 army troops and 1,500 Federal Police to the city as part of his battle against the drug lords.

But the federal military presence is being rolled back, and that will place additional pressure for reform on local law enforcement— which adds to Murguia’s frustration.

“We don’t see a dime of the [U.S.-funded] Merida Initiative on the municipal level which makes it hard to fight crime,” he said. “We are trying to tell U.S. officials we need to see more of that money in Juarez.”

The Merida Initiative was signed between the U.S. and Mexico in 2008. The U.S. agreed to fund the Mexican government’s war on drugs with $1.6 billion over three years. The funding primarily went for the purchase of helicopters and vehicles for the military. But with the military withdrawal, the municipality is now left to shoulder the burden of improving law enforcement  with a dwindling tax base. 

Improving officer safety and training is a key priority.  In 2010, 70 Juarez police were killed; 41 in 2011; and eight already in January of this year. Not all of Juarez’ crime problems are related to drugs and narcotics cartels.

Extortion has closed hundreds of businesses in Juarez, which has added to the difficulties in reviving the city’s near-dormant economy.

“Our number-one problem in Mexico is not drugs, (but) poverty,” says Murguia.  “Our young people are filled with anger because they have nothing.”

Juarez faces more than a 30 percent poverty rate and 15 percent unemployment. 

Juarez’ problems are far from over.

New Cartel

The January spike in police killings came as a new player in Mexico’s murderous drug organizations appeared on the scene, called the New Juarez cartel. 

Murguia denies it is a factor, but banners hung by cartel members around the city, popularly dubbed narco-mantas, warned that if Leyzoala didn’t resign,  a cop a day would be murdered.

That may be a backhanded compliment to the effectiveness of the new police strategies, but life has gotten even tougher for Juarez’ police force. Many officers had to be housed in heavily guarded motels after their shifts were completed. 

By mid-February, the killings had abated. But the threats were daunting, concedes Murguia.

 “They are always trying to intimidate the police here,” he says.

Nevertheless, Murguia said he expects violence to continue to abate.  Juarez, he maintains, is finally shaking off its “murder capital” title.

“Yes, we have our problems, but what city doesn’t?” Murguia said. “We are working very hard to fix things, but Juarez is coming back. 

Joseph J. Kolb is publisher of the Gallup Herald in New Mexico and an instructor in the Criminal Justice program at Western New Mexico University.  He welcomes comments from readers.